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The Public's Right of Access to "Some Kind of
Hearing": Creating Policies that Protect the Right to
Observe Agency Hearings
Christopher B. McNeil*
In the fall of 2006, a Cincinnati, Ohio, foster care couple caring
for a three-year-old developmentally disabled boy bound him with
duct tape, wrapped him in a blanket, and left him in a closet for
three days while the couple attended a family reunion.' After they
returned, they found him dead and disposed of his body by burning
it in an incinerator, while publicly claiming the child had wandered
off during an outing.2 In the investigation and murder trial that
followed, it became clear that the foster care agency that had
placed the child in this home would be char~ed by the state
department that regulates foster agencies in Ohio.
The public response to news of the murder generated an
unusual amount of interest in the department's administrative
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hearing. How could the private foster care agency have permitted
a vulnerable child to be placed with a couple who could do such a
horrible thing? What kind of protections are in place to make sure
such an agency is taking all appropriate steps to screen potential
foster parents? These issues captured the attention of the press and
public interest groups throughout the nation during the weeks that
led up to the hearing on the department's charges against the foster
care agency.
It is perhaps an understatement to observe that the typical
administrative hearing garners little or no media attention; agency
hearings tend to be either highly technical (like the setting of
Medicaid reimbursement rates for nursing home providers) or short
and boring (like the batch of fifty separate challenges to parking
citations issued by Chicago transit officers in any given morning in
the city's Office of Administrative Hearings). In addition, many
hearings conducted by state administrative agencies have
statutorily created barriers to public access. In the foster care
agency case, for example, Ohio law prohibits the release of the
identities of foster care applicants and providers.4 As a result,
there were motions seeking protective orders that barred the public
identification of those persons who had been screened by the foster
care agency. Similarly, it is not unusual, particularly in industrial
or utility rate cases, or in other administrative action involving
closely held trade secrets, to find one or more of the parties
demanding the sealing of records and the closure of evidentiary
hearings, prohibiting public access to the hearing.
Agency adjudications are not trials; they are an expedient
alternative employed because the subject matter is better suited to
executive branch decision-making than adjudication by a jury or a
trial court judge. There are no juries in agency hearings; the
judges are not part of the judicial branch of government; and in
many cases the agency that investigated and prosecuted the case
also hired, trained, supervises, and can fire the person who will
preside over the fact-finding process. Due process requires the
agency provide the litigants with "some kind of hearing," but there
is no right to the full range of protections afforded to civil or
4. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5153.17 (LexisNexis 2007).
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criminal litigants in judicial proceedings. 5 Agency hearings lack
the formality of judicially controlled trials, frequently permitting
hearsay and other evidence that would be excluded during civil or
criminal trials conducted by judicial branch courts. Also, through
the strength of sheer volume alone, the public tends to be wholly
uninterested in the process, at least until something like the foster
care agency case attracts national media attention.
Compared to trials, particularly criminal trials involving highly
publicized crimes, media attention given agency hearings generally
pales in comparison. It is probably true that in the main, few trial
courts are so frequently confronted with high-profile cases as to
cause much concern about how to balance a litigant's right to due
process and a fair trial with First Amendment rights of access to
judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, high-profile cases do arise
from time to time, and in response many courts have rules in place
that have been designed to strike the right balance between access
and a fair trial. But what happens when the tribunal is part of the
executive branch of government? Do the rules change when the
proceedings are conducted by an administrative agency instead of
a judicial branch court?
While the high-profile administrative hearing may be rare,
there is still a need to ensure both a fair hearing and a hearing that
is open to the public. What follows is a review of the law
applicable to public access of agency-run hearings. While staying
clear of the more state-specific open meetings and public records
laws, this Article considers the balance between First Amendment
provisions guaranteeing media access to executive branch
evidentiary hearings on the one hand, and due process protections
for the litigants in those hearings on the other hand. It surveys
existing judicial branch media access laws and policies, and notes
how judicial branch trials differ from agency-run hearings. Taking
those differences into account, it concludes with a model set of
public access rules for administrative adjudicators for use in high-
profile hearings.
5. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,
1275 (1975) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)).
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I. WHAT MAKES ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS DIFFERENT FROM
. COURT TRIALS?
If the question was largely an academic one at the start of the
new millennium, its character changed significantly after the attacks
of September I Ith and the subsequent United States military
detention of persons identified as enemy combatants at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. In a few short years, our interest in how the executive
branch conducts quasi-judicial hearings has sharpened, piqued by
governmental limitations placed on access to adjudicative hearings
both at home and abroad. Just how public does an administrative
hearing have to be? What rights of access apply when the interests
being litigated are limited to those wholly within the authority of a
regulatory body? Does an agency have an obligation to balance
participant privacy rights against public access rights? Do "open
meetings" laws that apply when agencies, boards, and commissions
conduct public business also apply when they conduct evidentiary
hearings? Are there benchmarks of fair and effective media
relations policies, standards that governmental agencies should
consider adopting when anticipating the role of the media in the
operation of administrative adjudications?
In many respects, media policies that have been developed by
judicial branch courts would seem to serve as appropriate templates
for executive branch adjudicators. There are, however, some
differences to consider. Agency hearings are conducted without
juries, so an agency media policy can be crafted without standards
for how the media will interact with prospective or impaneled jurors.
Agency adjudicators generally lack the power to enforce a contempt
citation, raising questions of whether an agency can hold media
representatives accountable for acts that violate the agency's media
policies. Further, administrative hearings tend to be civil in nature.
To the extent an agency bases its media policies on models
implemented by trial courts (models that likely accommodate
interests of persons charged with crimes), the agency's policies may
need to be adjusted to grant greater access than that of the trial court.
Despite these differences, the question remains: how can we balance
First Amendment interests in an open hearing against the tendency
of executive adjudicators to operate in a relatively controlled and
oftentimes closed environment?
[Vol. 681124
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II. APPLYING FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS RIGHTS TO EXECUTIVE
BRANCH HEARINGS
It is true that most of the case law describing the rights of
access under the First Amendment arises in the context of judicial
proceedings, not proceedings conducted by executive branch
adjudicators. This distinction was not lost on the Department of
Justice when it argued in post-9/11 deportation proceedings that
"the political branches of government are completely immune from
the First Amendment guarantee of access." 6 The argument failed
both times it was used,7 but the fact that such a claim was raised
suggests that some care needs to be taken when applying the
judicial trial access doctrine to executive branch hearings.
It is also true that the right of access to executive branch
activity may flow from more than one source. When a state
regulatory board meets, for example, state open meetings laws
generally ensure the right of access, subject to statutorily granted
restrictions (such as the ability to close a board meeting to the
public and go into executive session to discuss pending litigation).8
These laws may be of limited relevance, however, if the executive
agency delegates its power to adjudicate a claim-as when it relies
upon an administrative law judge (ALJ) or hearing officer. Open
meetings laws typically apply only when a majority of the
members of the board or commission meet.9 An executive agency,
board, or commission can avoid the application of state open
meetings laws simply by delegating their fact-finding authority to a
proxy, usually an employee or person under a contract, who is
given the power to preside over the evidentiary hearing.
6. Comm. on Commc'ns & Media Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., "If It Walks, Talks and Squawks .... ." The First Amendment Right of
Access to Administrative Adjudications: A Position Paper, 23 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 21, 38 (2005) (citing Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695
(6th Cir. 2002)).
7. Id. See also N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198,
201, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2002).
8. See Gannett Pac. Corp. v. City of Asheville, 632 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. App.
2006) (discussing closure to the public of a meeting of the City Council to
discuss water supply agreement and possible litigation over North Carolina
General Statutes section 143-318.1 1(a)(3)).
9. Id.
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The First Amendment access doctrine is the appropriate
starting point when crafting any media relations policy, whether
for a judicial branch court or for proceedings conducted by
administrative agencies. Whether the public's "qualified right of
access"' 10 may be restricted requires an analysis articulated in a line
of cases that started in 1980 with Richmond Newspapers"
(guaranteeing under the First Amendment the right to attend
criminal trials). The series of cases end in 1986 with Press-
Enterprise 11,12 in which the Court extended the right of access to
preliminary proceedings in addition to trials, and introduced a two-
part test considering whether "the place and process have
historically been open to the press and the general public," and
whether "public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question.' 3 In between
these benchmarks, the Court held in Globe Newspaper1 4 that a
court's restrictions on public access to criminal proceedings can be
justified only upon proof of a "compelling governmental interest,"
and such prohibitions could impose only those restrictions that are
"narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'15 It also extended the
doctrine beyond the criminal trial per se, applying First
Amendment media access rights in Press-Enterprises I" in the
context of the voir dire segment of criminal proceedings.17
III. TESTS USED WHEN BALANCING ACCESS AND DUE PROCESS
Media policies that restrict public access in the context of
judicial branch proceedings thus are subject to four tests. First,
when evaluating restrictive media policies, the court must
determine whether an open proceeding is "substantially likely to
10. Comm. on Commc'ns & Media Law, supra note 6, at 37.
11. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
12. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise H1), 478 U.S. 1
(1986).
13. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8).
14. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
15. Comm. on Commc'ns & Media Law, supra note 6, at 33-34 (citing
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07).
16. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S.
501 (1984).
17. Comm. on Commc'ns & Media Law, supra note 6, at 33-34.
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prejudice another transcendent value."' 8  Second, if the court is
satisfied that such prejudice is likely, it must determine "whether
any alternative exists to avoid that prejudice without limiting
public access."' 9 Third, if no such alternative exists, the court
must determine "whether the limitation of access is narrowed (in
scope and time) to the minimum necessary." 20 Fourth, the court
must determine "whether the limitation of access effectively avoids
the prejudice it is intended to address." 21
Consider, for example, the case where claimants seeking
unemployment compensation convinced the ALJ to close the
evidentiary hearing on their claims. Here, the claimants were two
attorneys who resigned from positions with the New York
Attorney General's office, claiming that their continued
involvement in a political corruption investigation would have
violated their duties under the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility. 22  When a newspaper reporter challenged the
closure order, the ALJ responded that it was a misdemeanor for an
officer or employee to disclose information obtained in these
hearings "without authority of the commissioner or otherwise
required by law."23  Conducting a statutory analysis and not
relying on any constitutional authority,24 the court held the ALJ
erred in closing the hearing without first allowing the newspaper
an opportunity to be heard on the question, and without conducting
an examination into "whether compelling reasons existed for
closure of any portion of the hearing."
' !
On the other hand, where there is no common law or statutory
right of access, as was the case with professional disciplinary
18. Id. at 36 (citing Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510; Globe Newspaper,
457 U.S. at 606-07).
19. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),
478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d
Cir. 1984)).
20. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510; United States v. Antar,
38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994)).
21. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609-10; Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976); In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 854-55 (4th Cir. 1989)).
22. Herald Co., Inc. v. Weisenberg, 452 N.E.2d 1190 (N.Y. 1983).
23. Id. at 1192.
24. Id. at 1191 (refusing to consider the newspaper's First Amendment
arguments raised for the first time on appeal).
25. Id. at 1193.
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proceedings for teachers in New York, the constitutional analysis
for public access to disciplinary hearings follows the rationale
found in Press-Enterprise Co. I and 11.26 Noting that historically
teacher disciplinary hearings were closed to the public in New
York, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly
found there was no First Amendment right of access because
"there is no suggestion that professional disciplinary hearings have
any tradition of being open to the public and no showing that the
public access plays 'a significant positive role' in the functioning
of the proceedings."
27
Note that courts distinguish between the fact-finding part of an
agency's evidentiary hearing and the deliberative process that
follows such a hearing.2 8 While fact-finding may resemble the
trial, an agency's deliberation over the evidence resembles the jury
deliberation and may be closed to the public. Rejecting the
newspaper's claim of a First Amendment right to observe the
deliberations of a disciplinary board after the fact-finding process
ended, the court held that "[n]one of the cases cited by the media
on the right of access, however, extends that right to judicial, jury,
or administrative deliberations.... Further, the Supreme Court has
long recognized a general bar against probing 'mental processes'
of administrative decision-makers. 29
Consider also the tension between First Amendment access
interests and the need for secrecy founded on grounds of public
safety. While applying the same tests under Richmond Newspapers,
two federal appellate courts have reached significantly different
conclusions about the need for public access to administrative
hearings conducted by the federal Immigration Court. In response
to the attacks of September 11 th, Chief U.S. Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy issued a directive that required all immigration
judges to "hold hearings individually, to close the hearings to the
26. Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046 (N.Y. 1990).
27. Id. at 1049 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. (Press-
Enterprise !), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
28. See, e.g., Marion County Sheriff's Merit Bd. v. Peoples Broad. Corp.,
547 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. 1989).
29. Id. at 240 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1971);
Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D. Utah
1985), appeal dismissed, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987) ("The Constitution is
not... a Freedom of Information Act.")).
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public, and to avoid discussing the case or otherwise disclosing
any information about the case to anyone outside the Immigration
Court." 30 This meant no family members, no press, no outside
observers-even the court's docket was closed to the public so that
no outside observers would know the names of persons whose
cases were being heard on any given day.3 1  Newspapers
challenged the closure of immigration hearings in both the Sixth
Circuit, in Detroit Free Press v.. Ashcrofi,3 and in the Third
Circuit, in North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft.33 Both courts
agreed that the constitutional analysis found in Richmond
Newspapers applies to administrative hearings conducted by the
Immigration Court, with the Sixth Circuit making it plain that the
Richmond analysis applies to quasi-judicial 3roceedings like those
that are conducted by the executive branch. The appellate courts
differed, however, on the degree of access immigration courts
historically tolerated and on the intrinsic value of openness in
immigration proceedings.
The Sixth Circuit found the history of access to immigration
hearings was sufficient to meet the Richmond test requiring open
access, whereas the Third Circuit found the history to be lacking,
holding that "[n]ewspapers cannot claim a general First
Amendment right to government proceedings without urging a
judicially-imposed revolution in the administrative state.,,3 The
Sixth Circuit was particularly expressive in condemning the
government's position, writing:
The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people's lives, outside
the public eye, and behind a closed door. Democracies die
behind closed doors. The First Amendment, through a free
press, protects the people's right to know that their
government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in
30. C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 10.04
(2005) (citing Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 952 n.7 (E.D.
Mich.), aff'd, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)).
31. Id.
32. 195 F. Supp. 2d 937.
33. 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D. N.J.), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
34. DIENES ET AL., supra note 30, at § 10.04 (citing Detroit Free Press, 303
F.3d at 694-95).
35. Id. (citing N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d
Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 696 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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deportation proceedings. When government begins closing
doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging
to the people. Selective information is misinformation.36
In a 2-1 decision (with Judge Scirica dissenting), the Third
Circuit found the Immigration Court's history of public access
insufficient to give rise to a First Amendment right of access.
37
Beyond that, the court reasoned that in this context the court's
"logic" test could not be met. Drawing from both Richmond and
Press-Enterprise 11, the court observed that "[t]he logic test
compels us to consider 'whether public access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question.' 38 It recalled "six values typically served by openness":
[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental
affairs by providing the public with the more complete
understanding of the judicial system; [2] promotion of the
public perception of fairness which can be achieved only
by permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3]
providing a significant community therapeutic value as an
outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion; [4]
serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the
judicial process to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the
performance of all involved; and [6] discouragement of
perjury.3 9
While the court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that open access
to immigration proceedings "performs each of these salutary
functions,' 4° the court held that "that cannot be the story's end, for
to gauge accurately whether a role is positive, the calculus must
perforce take account of the flip side-the extent to which
openness impairs the public good."4 1  Finding that "open
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 216 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1H), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
39. Id. at 217 (quoting United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir.
1994)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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deportation hearings would threaten national security," the court
rejected the newspaper's First Amendment claim.42
Also noteworthy is the difference in each court's approach to
the media policy imposed by the Chief Immigration Judge. The
Third Circuit relied upon the declaration of Dale Watson, the FBI's
Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence, who convinced the court that there could be
no case-by-case determination of whether access needed to be
limited. In his declaration, Watson stated that "the government
cannot proceed to close hearings on a case-by-case basis, as the
identification of certain cases for closure, and the introduction of
evidence to support that closure, could itself expose critical
information about which activities and patterns of behavior merit
such closure." 43 Without much critical analysis, the Third Circuit
appears to have accepted this premise, writing that "[t]hese
officials believe that closure of special interest hearings is
necessary to advance these goals, and their concerns, as expressed
in the Watson Declaration, have gone unrebutted. To the extent
that the Attorney General's national security concerns seem
credible, we will not lightly second-guess them.
'
"
4
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, found that the very broad
directive from the Chief Immigration Judge lacked the requisite
case-specific analysis: "The directive is over-inclusive by
categorically and completely closing all special interest hearings
without demonstrating, beyond speculation, that such a closure is
absolutely necessary.
45
IV. CREATING EFFECTIVE MEDIA POLICIES
To be effective, media policies must not only anticipate the
tests courts will use when those policies are challenged, but also
squarely address the practical concerns likely to be raised by the
media and the public. Those concerns are not static; they change
with the public's interest in a given proceeding. Media policies
thus tend to provide one set of rules for day-to-day business and
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 219.
45. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2002).
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another set of rules for use with high-profile cases. For example,
when planning for the needs of the public and the media in federal
criminal proceedings against Lewis Libby, the district court
recognized that the trial "has generated widespread public and
media interest," in part due to the possibility that Vice President
Cheney and commentator Tim Russert might be called as
witnesses. a6 After receiving over one hundred requests for press
credentials, the trial court permitted only two journalists to be
present in the courtroom during voir dire. The court, however, also
created a Media Center, where credentialed journalists could view
the proceedings in their entirety (including jury selection), through
live closed circuit video and audio feeds (although recording was
not permitted).47 The court denied a request for audio recordings
of the daily proceedings, stating that it historically has made no
audio recordings of any of the proceedings of such trials, and
noting the restrictions applicable under the Judiciary Policies of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.48
The court's approach was thus consistent with the commentary
supplementing the "cameras in the courtroom" policy found in the
General Management and Administration section of the Guide to
Judiciary Policies and Procedures used by federal judges. The
commentary notes a distinction between the use of cameras during
ceremonial proceedings (where cameras are generally permitted)
and during non-ceremonial proceedings. During non-ceremonial
proceedings, cameras may be utilized "only for the limited
purposes specified in the policy statement: presentation of
evidence, perpetuation of the record, security, other purposes of
judicial administration, and the photographing, recording, or
broadcasting of appellate arguments. ' 9 As the Guide explains,
Except with respect to ceremonial proceedings and
appellate proceedings, the Conference policy does not
authorize the contemporaneous photographing, recording,
or broadcasting of proceedings from the courtroom to the
46. United States v. I. Lewis Libby, No. 07-0002 (RBW), slip op. at 1, 6
(D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://www.spj.org/pdfglibby/LibbyOrder.pdf
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id.
49. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ch. 3, pt. E (2001) (on file with author).
1132 [Vol. 68
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public beyond the courthouse walls. The Judicial
Conference remains of the view that it would not be
appropriate to require all non-ceremonial proceedings to be
subject to media broadcasting.5 °
V. THE HIGH-PROFILE CASE
What makes a case a high-profile case? A precise definition
might be neither possible nor necessary. A survey of state media
access policies suggests that state trial courts frequently establish
standards for day-to-day media access to judicial proceedings,
while often creating a second-tier set of protocols for use in high-
profile cases. 51 One example comes from Lake County, Ohio,
which has a Media Relations and Public Access Plan.52 In this
plan, the court defined "special interest" or "high-profile" cases as
involving one or more of the following:
The interest of a fair trial for the litigants is jeopardized in
any way.
The security and decorum of the court are in jeopardy.
The news media directly or indirectly interferes with the
court's daily function and purpose.
The court's facilities are, or foreseeably will be,
overburdened.
50. Id.
51. Media policies considered for this analysis were from the following
courts: COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LAKE COUNTY, OHIO, MEDIA RELATIONS
AND PUBLIC ACCESS PLAN (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www2.
lakecountyohio.org/courts/images/Lake%20County/ 20Common%20Pleas%20
Court%20Media%20Plan%2OEffI/o204-1-05.pdf, SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL.,
COUNTY OF KINGS, MEDIA PLAN FOR SUPERIOR COURT HIGH PROFILE CASES
(July 2005), available at http://www.kings.courts.ca.gov/News%20and%
20Media/NM%2ODocs/PressMediaPlan%20Rev%207.05.pdf; California Courts,
Photographing, Recording, and Broadcasting in the Courtroom, § B, R. 980
(Jan. 1, 1997), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/cameras-
toc.htm; Seventh Judicial Cir. Court of Fla., Media Procedures for Special
Interest/High-Profile Proceedings (June 15, 2007), available at http://
www.circuit7.org/Communications/mediaguidelines.html; Tenth Judicial Cir.
Court of Fla., Procedures for Special Interest/High Profile Proceedings, Admin.
Order No. 1-19.0 (Aug. 11, 1994), available at http://www.judlO.org/
AdministrativeOrders/orders/Sectionl/1-19.0.htm; U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of
Alaska, Media Guide (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/
reference/general/mediaguide.pdf.
52. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LAKE COUNTY, OHIO, supra note 51.
2008] 1133
1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The administration of the court and of justice would be
best served by implementing this media plan.
It appears to the public that the court is not being
administered fairly and efficiently.
53
It is not always easy to predict, however, when a case will
become "high-profile," nor is it necessarily essential to define with
real precision what constitutes a high-profile case. Administrative
hearings generally attract very little media attention. As such, if a
reporter shows up at an administrative hearing, that by itself may
suggest the case is, or could become, of great public interest,
warranting the use of procedures designed to ensure reasonable
access to the proceedings. Over time, this lack of media attention
may have created a culture of insulation in state agencies, in which
by rule or practice the agency deems it prudent to close its
evidentiary hearings to the public. While this might be
understandable, it is based on a premise that perhaps will not
withstand close judicial scrutiny. What would happen, for
example, if a state agency regulating nuclear power plant
applications determined that trade secret laws and homeland
security regulations required the closure of the fact-finding
hearings associated with the licensing process?
It is generally true that agency adjudications are not "public
meetings," at least in those cases where the adjudicator is an
administrative law judge, hearing examiner, or other delegated
fact-finder. (If the agency is a board or commission, such as a
state board regulating the practice of dentistry, in which board
members themselves hear the evidence, then the applicable open
meetings law may well apply.) The implication here is that while
the parties to a fact-finding hearing would be given advance notice
of a scheduled evidentiary hearing, there would be no notice akin
to that given when the agency engages in rulemaking. Thus, a
hearing that might otherwise attract a significant amount of public
interest or media attention might proceed undetected by the press.
It is also true that state public records laws might not apply, at
least not to the hearing itself. While the state agency prosecuting
the case may well be within the scope of the state's open records
laws (because the agency is the records custodian), the same
53. Id. § 5.1.6.
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cannot always be said of the agency's adjudicator-who may be a
contractor or part of a separate office of administrative hearings,
whose duties do not include maintaining the records found within
the scope of the state public records laws. Further, patient and
other privacy protection rights may apply, constituting a
substantial barrier to open access to both testimonial and
documentary evidence being introduced at an agency hearing. (In
the case involving the foster care agency, the state's position had
been that foster care parent privacy rights were so pervasive under
state law that even the hearing examiner assigned to the case
would not be permitted to see the records maintained by the foster
care agency or the department--a position that did not survive a
challenge by the foster care agency.) As a result, the documents
used as exhibits in an evidentiary hearing might not be available to
the public, at least not until they are admitted as exhibits in the
hearing, and a public record is made of those exhibits.
While the draft model that follows includes a definition of a
"high-profile case," the policies themselves need not be limited to
cases that attract national attention. Rather, the policies should be
available whenever there is abnormal interest on the part of the
public--interest that may be indicated by the presence of the press
or simply by members of the public who have decided to spend
their time attending an agency's evidentiary hearing.
Once the media plan describes the conditions that trigger
"high-profile" measures, there generally is a provision for the
exercise of discretion in how media access will be
controlled-discretion by the presiding judge, the chief or
administrative judge, the court press officer, the court
administrator, or some other person appointed specifically as a
liaison between the court and the media. Thus, if an administrative
agency is to successfully craft a media plan based on judicial
models, it would need to determine what conditions must exist to
warrant these controls over the presumptively public hearing and
who within the agency will decide whether those conditions exist
in a particular case.
2008] 1135
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VI. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A HIGH-PROFILE AGENCY
ADJUDICATION MEDIA PLAN
After identifying what constitutes a "high-profile" case and
determining who will invoke media access controls in high-profile
cases, judicial plans typically address six areas: (1) physical access
to the courtroom structure (ways in, ways out, use of hallways,
chambers, and courtrooms); (2) sharing or pooling of equipment;
(3) issuance of press credentials; (4) restrictions on electronic
monitoring and recording; (5) communication with the presiding
officer; and (6) courthouse safety and security issues. Many plans
also call for collaboration among stakeholders, where the court
enlists members of the press, the public, the legal community,
courtroom security officers, and others, to help fine-tune media
policies long before a high-profile case arises.
While each of these factors needs to be considered in the
context of administrative hearings, some thought must be given to
the differences between hearings conducted by executive agencies
and trials conducted by trial judges in the judicial branch. Unlike
proceedings conducted before trial courts, many agency hearings
are held in spaces dramatically different from local courtrooms. In
states where there is a centralized office of administrative hearings,
like the one in Hunt Valley, Maryland, the physical structure looks
very much like a courthouse with a series of very small hearing
rooms, few of which would actually accommodate more than a
handful of people at any one time. More common, however, is the
hearing conducted not in an office of administrative hearings, but
by the agency itself, frequently well within the bowels of the
agency's administrative offices.
It is not at all uncommon, for instance, to find a hearing on
whether a truck driver will lose his or her commercial driver's
license (CDL) being conducted in an office of the State
Department of Motor Vehicles. The normal, garden variety CDL
disqualification hearing garners virtually no attention, and the
matter can be disposed of quickly and efficiently. If, on the other
hand, the case has caught the attention of advocacy groups intent
on drawing attention to the need for changes in state DUI laws
(perhaps it involves an incident where the driver is a repeat DUI
offender and Mothers Against Drunk Driving is bringing victims
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and the press to the hearing), one can anticipate the need for
control over the hearing room.
Also noteworthy is the frequent lack of security, where in the
ordinary course of a day's hearing there may be several dozen
litigants filing in and out of a hearing room under conditions that
resemble not so much a trial but a casting call. Agency adjudicators
need to be able to plan for the exceptional case, where the issues are
highly charged and have garnered demands for public or media
access. While courts may have developed protocols for these
exceptional cases, few agencies know to do so. One has only to
recall the national press coverage of the hearings conducted before
the administrative agency responsible for reviewing challenges to
vote counts in the various Florida counties during the 2000
presidential election to be reminded of how ill-suited many of these
hearing rooms are for handling high-profile cases.
VII. APPLYING MODELS OF COURT MEDIA PLANS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
If one were to draw the best practices in use from judicial
branch courts, intending to apply those practices to help create
media policies for use by administrative agencies, some care would
need to be taken. First, we would need to recognize that agencies
may lack a solid understanding of the obligation to balance due
process and free speech rights. After all, courts are very familiar
with these terms, but agencies encounter them only when they
engage in adjudication (which in some agencies may happen only
rarely). Second, we should understand that due process protections
are fluid, not fixed. A licensee facing the revocation of his or her
license is not entitled to a jury, or in many cases to discovery.
While judicial branch courts must safeguard a criminal defendant's
right to empanel a qualified jury, no such right extends to the
licensee. As a result, media access plans need to take into account
the nature of the rights at stake in an administrative hearing. And
third, we should recognize and accept the obligation to work
towards keeping agency adjudications open. Even in the context
of agency adjudications, the presumption is that the proceeding
should be open and accessible to the public and the media. As the
district court noted in deciding access rights in the context of
113720081
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immigration hearings, "there are two broad categories of
exceptions to the practice of openness in the courtroom: those
based on the need to keep order and dignity in the courtroom, and
those which center on the content of the information to be
disclosed to the public. 54 Only "the most compelling reasons"
can justify closure based on the content of the information being
disclosed during an administrative hearing. 55 While there does not
appear to be one set standard for when an administrative
proceeding needs the benefit of a policy that balances due process
rights with public access rights, adjudicators should be mindful of
the nature and intensity of media attention when designing a policy
for high-profile administrative hearings.
In addition, these public access rules need to take into account
specific privacy protections that may exist--such as statutes that
restrict the disclosure of complainant identities in medical
licensing cases or limit the public's access to records in cases
involving foster care or adoption agencies. The policies also have
to recognize (and not contradict) existing laws providing for
accommodating persons with disabilities and similar public access
requirements.
It should also be noted that the media is not some alien outlier
here. While a high-profile case may cause outside journalists to
pay attention to a local administrative hearing, rules for public
access need to be designed for the public-including friends and
family, Internet bloggers, local and regional reporters, as well as
representatives of the national press.
VIII. A DRAFT SAMPLE AGENCY MEDIA PLAN
With these principles in mind, guided by policies implemented
by a number of courts across the country but mindful of the
differences existing between judicial branch courts and executive
branch adjudicators, consider the sample media access policy
presented in the appendix for use in high-profile cases conducted
by administrative agencies. Note that the sample observes this
54. Freitas v. Admin. Dir. of Courts, 92 P.3d 993, 998 (Haw. 2004) (citing
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp 2d 937, 945 (E.D. Mich.), af'd, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)).
55. Id.
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limit: It does not address the equally important rights of access to
the documents and records typically associated with agency action.
Thus, the policy focuses on physical, visual, and auditory access to
the room where a hearing is to be conducted, but defers to state
public records laws for access to transcripts, documentary
evidence, and other records that play a part in administrative
hearings.56 So too, the media access policy needs to be written so
as not to conflict with existing laws requiring safe ingress and
egress to public buildings for all, including persons with
disabilities.
56. See infra app.
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APPENDIX
Public Access Rules for Administrative Adjudicators in High-
Profile Hearings
(1) Definitions
(a) "Media coverage" means any photographing, recording,
reporting, or broadcasting of administrative hearings, and includes
transmission through television, radio, photographic images, the
Internet, Wi-fi and satellite transmission, and any other form of
transmission outside the hearing room.
(b) The "hearing room" means the room in which the
adjudication hearing is to be held.
(c) The "agency adjudicator" means the administrative law
judge, administrative hearing examiner, administrative hearing
officer, or any person serving as the presiding officer in a fact-
finding hearing conducted pursuant to the State Administrative
Procedure Act.
(d) A "high-profile case" is an administrative proceeding in
which an adjudicator will preside over a fact-finding hearing
conducted pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act
where at least one of the following is true:
i. The interests of a fair hearing for any litigant may be
jeopardized due to the degree of media attention being given to
the proceeding;
ii. The security and decorum of the administrative
proceeding may be in jeopardy due to the degree of media
attention being given to the proceeding;
iii. The news media directly or indirectly interferes with
the administrative proceeding;
iv. The agency's facilities for conducting the
administrative proceeding are, or foreseeably will be,
overburdened;
v. The administration of justice would be best served by
implementing this media plan; or
vi. It appears to the public that the administrative
proceeding is not being fairly or efficiently conducted.
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(e) The "media information officer" shall be the Agency's
designee, and shall be responsible for communicating with
members of the public and those providing media coverage.
(2) Application
These provisions apply when either the agency adjudicator or
the media information officer has determined that a matter pending
on the agency's docket is a high-profile case, as that term is
defined in this media policy.
(3) Physical Access to the Hearing Room
A. The hearing room will be opened to the public one-half
hour before the proceedings are scheduled to begin.
B. The media information officer shall designate a specified
number of seats in the public area of the hearing room for (a) the
parties' family, friends and designees; (b) media representatives;
and (c) the general public.
C. Admission to the public section of the hearing room shall
be gained by presenting a pass that shall be issued by the media
information officer on a first-come, first-served basis, unless the
demand for access exceeds the space available. The media
committee will determine whether the demand for space is such
that the pass shall be valid for one session only (either morning or
afternoon). The hearing room will be cleared between the morning
and afternoon sessions.
D. Hallways, building entrances and exits, the steps and
sidewalks leading to the building, and rooms in the building other
than the hearing room, shall not be used for media coverage.
(4) Sharing or Pooling of Equipment
A. If warranted by the demand for the use of equipment, the
media information officer will convene a meeting of media
representatives. The media representatives will be given the
opportunity to determine whether pooling of media equipment will
be necessary, which representatives will be granted access to the
proceedings, and the conditions under which that access will be
granted.
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B. Either the media information officer or, if warranted, the
members of the media representatives, will determine whether
more than one photographer will be permitted, and whether any
limits on the number of cameras or lenses is warranted.
C. No cell phones or cell phone cameras will be permitted to
capture or transmit any of the proceedings.
D. All cameras will be located in the back of the hearing room
unless otherwise provided by the agency adjudicator.
E. Only one audio system for external radio, Internet, or Wi-fi
broadcast will be permitted in the hearing room.
F. The media coverage provider or providers acquiring access
to the hearing room shall provide, upon request and without
charge, a copy of the unedited media to the agency.
G. The agency adjudicator may permit the use of an
inconspicuous personal recording device (other than a cell phone),
by any person seeking to make an audio recording of the
proceedings as personal notes of the proceedings. The recordings
shall not be used for any purpose other than as personal notes.
(5) Issuance of Press Credentials
A. All applications to provide media coverage shall be made
to the media information officer, not later than 48 hours before the
scheduled start of the hearing.
B. The media information officer shall issue press credentials
to members of the media who present satisfactory proof that they
are bona fide members of the media.
C. The media information officer may convene a meeting of
interested media representatives for the purpose of establishing a
media committee.
(6) Restrictions on Electronic Monitoring and Recording
A. Media coverage of conferences between attorneys and their
clients in the hearing room is prohibited, as is focusing on or
photographing any materials on counsel tables, in a way that would
permit the recording of non-public material, such as an attorney's
notes or confidential comments to a client.
B. No media equipment may be set up or taken down while
the hearing is in session.
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C. No media equipment may be used during the lunch break or
when the hearing is not in session.
D. Neither spotlights nor flash units may be used in the
hearing room.
E. All cables placed in corridors, sidewalks, or streets shall be
covered in such a manner as not to impede the flow of vehicular or
pedestrian traffic.
F. Proceedings in the hearing room shall not be photographed,
recorded, or broadcast, except as provided in this rule.
G. No proceedings will be delayed or continued for the sole
purpose of allowing media coverage.
(7) Hearing Room Safety and Security Issues
The media information officer shall be responsible for
identifying the agency officer responsible for safety and security
issues. The safety and security officer, the media information
officer, and the agency adjudicator, shall develop a security
coverage plan.
(8) Establishment and Duties of the Media Committee
A. The media information officer shall be the chair of any
media committee convened under these policies. The members of
the committee shall include the agency adjudicator and at least one
representative each, as selected by the media information officer,
from television, print, radio, wire service, and Internet service.
B. As soon as practicable after establishing the media
committee, the media information officer shall convene a meeting
of the media representatives selected to serve on the committee.
C. Among the duties of the media committee are: designating
pool coverage; determining pool equipment and camera locations;
recommending to the agency adjudicator suitable interview and
press conference areas; assisting with the allocation of press
credentials and hearing room seating assignments; equipping the
hearing room and any supplemental media room; and working with
the media to accommodate any special needs.
D. The media committee may recommend the establishment of
a media room. If recommended and approved, the media room
will be designated within close proximity to the proceeding. It will
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be operated under the direction of the media information officer,
and will be open during normal working hours to all media
representatives with agency-issued media credentials. The room
will accommodate monitors and other equipment provided by the
media committee members, to permit coverage of the proceedings
by media representatives who are unable to obtain seating in the
hearing room.
